HARNER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/8/2010 4:00 PM

Barriers to Effective Risk Management
Michelle M. Harner

∗

ABSTRACT
“[A]s long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.
**
We’re still dancing.”

This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former
Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality
and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America.
These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and
some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial
sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural
norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make
implementing a meaningful risk culture and mitigating the impact of
future economic downturns a challenging proposition.
The global recession highlighted significant failures in firms’
risk-management practices. These failures implicated weaknesses not
only in firms’ financial risk modeling, but also the human or governance side of risk management. Unfortunately, fixing the former
might be significantly easier than attending to the latter. Studies
suggest that cognitive biases, including confirmation bias, overconfidence or optimism bias, and framing, can impair a board’s and management’s ability to assess risk accurately. These problems are compounded by the typical incentive structure and the “winner-take-all”
mentality adopted by many corporations in the United States.
∗
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This Article analyzes the potential benefits of improved riskmanagement practices, commonly called enterprise risk management
(ERM), and the potential barriers to implementing meaningful ERM
at U.S. firms. ERM is an integrated risk-management framework that
seeks to improve knowledge of and communication about potential
risks throughout the firm, starting with the board and senior management team. Indeed, the board and senior management team are
vital to creating a risk culture. This Article considers the impact of
boardroom dynamics and U.S. corporate culture on risk-management
practices. This Article further considers whether regulation or a different approach is needed to encourage U.S. corporations to invest
the necessary human capital in meaningful ERM.
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INTRODUCTION

Risk management is not a new concept, but it typically garners
renewed attention during periods of corporate scandals or market
1
turmoil. The global recession of 2008 (“2008 recession”) is no ex2
ception.
Many commentators have highlighted significant risk3
management failures as contributing factors to that recession.
The recurring nature of the risk-management problem suggests
that the approach to, or the implementation of, corporate riskmanagement practices is lacking in some respect. Prior studies show
that meaningful risk-management practices can enhance firm per4
formance. Yet U.S. corporations are slow to embrace risk manage1
For example, Barings Bank, Long-Term Capital Management, and the Asian
Crisis each are often viewed as a case study in risk management failures. See, e.g.,
JOHN MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USES AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (2003)
(discussing risk management issues raised by derivatives trading and analyzing the
Barings Bank and Long-Term Capital Management scenarios, among others);
GEOFFREY POITRAS, RISK MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES
(2002) (same); Wing Thye Woo, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis, and the Prospects
for Resuming High Growth, in EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
9–31 (Lok-Sanh Ho & Chi-Wa Yuen eds., 2003); Case Studies, INT’L FIN. RISK INST.,
http://riskinstitute.ch/Introduction.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (analyzing Barings Bank, Long-Term Capital Management, and the Asian Crisis in the context of
risk management).
2
This Article uses the term “2008 recession” to reference the entire period of
financial turmoil, which became widely evident in late 2007 and continued into 2009.
3
See, e.g., Roger Barker, Observations on the Current Crisis from a Corporate Governance Perspective, INST. DIRECTORS, Feb. 20, 2009, at 2, available at
https://www.iod.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/article_responding_crisi
s.pdf; Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN.
MARKET TRENDS, Feb. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/
1/42229620.pdf; Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at MM24,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?_r=1&
pagewanted=print; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition
(May 15, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20080515a.htm); RISK & INS. MGMT. SOC’Y, INC., THE 2008 FINANCIAL
CRISIS: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (Bill Coffin ed., 2009),
available at http://www.RIMS.org/ERMwhitepaper [hereinafter RIMS PAPER]. For a
summary of the role of risk management in the 2008 recession, see Michelle M.
Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the
Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. TECH. L. 45 (2010).
4
See Lori A. Brassell-Cicchinit, The Shareholder Value of Crisis Handling, RISK
MGMT., May 2003 (explaining 1997 study showing value in risk planning and discussing case studies); Steven M. Cassidy et al., The Market Value of the Corporate Risk Management Function, 57 J. RISK & INS. 664, 668 (1990) (explaining that markets react positively to risk management); Patrick J. Stroh, Enterprise risk management at UnitedHealth
Group, 87 STRATEGIC FIN. 26 (2005); Marcel Boyer et al., The Value of Risk Management: A Frontier Analysis 1 (Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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ment, and as evidenced by the 2008 recession, even when they do, the
5
results are underwhelming.
This Article examines two possible barriers to effective risk man6
agement: individual biases and cultural norms. At its core any riskmanagement technique attempts to provide corporate decision makers with better and more accurate information to identify, assess, and
7
mitigate events that threaten firm value (i.e., risk events). A firm certainly can adopt strict procedures instructing managers on how and
what types of information to evaluate, detailing the timing and participants in risk assessment meetings and requiring periodic reports to
the board of directors and senior executives. Those procedures
alone, however, will not necessarily change a firm’s decision regarding any particular risk, deter corporate fraud, or help moderate mar8
ket turmoil. Individuals still make those decisions, and their possible
biases and surrounding environment may be more influential than
9
any risk assessment reports.
This reality raises an important question: Can the law change the
way individuals receive and filter information, or is the human component of risk management an inevitable limitation on its utility?
The question is difficult to answer definitively, but this Article sug-

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687127 (describing a study
showing that the “role of financial risk management is to create flexibility to alleviate
this inefficiency problem
. . . [and] it does contribute indirectly to the value of the firm”); Brian W. Nocco &
Rene M. Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=921402 (discussing value of risk management in context of competitive
advantage and shareholder wealth).
5
See infra Parts II.A, II.C.
6
See discussion infra Part V.A (explaining that many of the biases discussed in
the individual context apply in the group or collective board context as well); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83–84, 99–108 (1985) (describing bases of ingroup bias
among directors). ’
7
See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
8
See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward
a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1551243 (using boardroom conference example to illustrate uncertainty
in decision-making process and noting that, despite extensive advice provided at
meeting, “when the time came to make the decision, the CEO had no authority upon
which to fall back except her own”).
9
See infra Part V.A.
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gests that policymakers will encourage, and corporate boards will design and implement, more effective risk-management practices if they
acknowledge and attempt to address this limitation.
To assist in this endeavor, this Article analyzes three of the cognitive biases that may impede risk assessment—confirmation bias,
overconfidence/optimism bias, and framing—and considers how
10
other legal disciplines have addressed bias in decision making. This
Article uses Citigroup Inc. as a case study to highlight potential beha11
vioral and cultural barriers to effective risk management. This Article suggests that training and outside assessment may help corporate decision makers avoid some biases in risk assessment and
response decisions.
This Article also considers corporate culture and whether the
environment at entrepreneurial or risk-aggressive firms poses a bar12
rier to effective risk-management practices. Most commentators acknowledge that some risk taking is healthy and often necessary to en13
hancing firm performance. The goal of risk management should
not be the elimination of all risk, but rather the pursuit of prudent
and informed risk profiling and decision making. The challenge
then is to convince firms that value and reward successful high-risk
endeavors that risk management can enhance their decisions without
changing their profit-oriented objectives.

10

For a general discussion of cognitive biases and decision making, see Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124 (1974). See also infra Part IV.A.
11
See infra Parts IV, V.
12
For a general discussion of corporate culture, see Alice Belcher, Imagining How
a Company Thinks: What is Corporate Culture?, 11 DEAKIN L. REV. 1, 18 (2006). See also
infra Part IV.B.
13
See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT 7 (2007) (“A business that decides to protect itself against all risk is unlikely to generate much upside for its owners; however, a business that exposes itself
to the wrong types of risk may be even worse off, because it is more likely to be damaged than helped by the risk exposure.”); Diane Brady, Sarbanes-Oxley = a Downturn in
Corporate Risk-Taking, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/
careers/managementiq/archives/2007/09/sarbanes-oxley.html (discussing the need
for risk taking to spur economic growth and citing two academic papers suggesting
that the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 reduced risk taking); Donald L. Kohn, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the Official Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (Nov. 12, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20081112a.htm) (“A central challenge will be to structure financial oversight to both deter unwanted and excessive risk-taking and permit the innovation that can ultimately boost economic
growth.”).
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This Article evaluates these complex issues in the context of en14
terprise risk management (“ERM”). As explained below, ERM is a
holistic approach to risk management that goes beyond financial risk
modeling and seeks to integrate a firm’s risk assessment and response
15
practices. It also is a form of risk management that holds value for
firms outside of the financial and insurance industries. Consequently, although this Article uses financial institution examples from the
2008 recession, the analysis and suggested prescriptions apply across
industries and have far broader implications than simply addressing
16
the fallout from the recession.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the ERM movement, discussing its origins, key components, and perceived role in
the 2008 recession. Part III summarizes the various regulatory and
judicial responses to the 2008 recession that involve some aspect of
risk management. Part IV presents a case study of Citigroup Inc. and
analyzes its decision-making process during the 2008 recession in
light of events and developments in its industry and the economy
more generally at the time. Part V then uses the Citigroup case study
to evaluate the impact of cognitive biases and corporate culture on
risk-management decisions. This analysis leads to a discussion of potential regulatory and market responses to strengthen the ERM
movement. This Article concludes by encouraging policymakers and
corporate boards to consider cognitive biases and the importance of
corporate culture as part of their risk-management dialogue.
II. OVERVIEW OF ERM
17

Risk often is defined simply as “the possibility of loss or injury.”
In the business context, the concept of risk includes not only the
probability of loss but also the consequences of that loss or risk

14

See infra Part II.
See id.; see also COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N,
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2004),
available
at
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_Executive
Summary.pdf [hereinafter COSO REPORT] (describing ERM framework).
16
See, e.g., Steven J. Dreyer & Amra Balic, Progress Report: Integrating Enterprise Risk
Management Analysis into Corporate Credit Ratings, STANDARD & POOR’S, July 22, 2009, at
2,
available
at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/events/
IntegratingERM72209.pdf (“In May 2008, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services announced its intention to include enterprise risk management (“ERM”) assessments
in ratings of nonfinancial companies.”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 17–18 (discussing broad utility of ERM and emphasizing its application in the context of nonfinancial firms).
17
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1018 (9th ed. 1985).
15
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18

event. Managing quantifiable risk is a much easier task than considering unquantifiable risk. Nevertheless, as suggested by the 2008
19
recession, prudent risk management needs to consider both.
Yet taking this type of broad, all-encompassing approach to
20
managing business risk is a relatively new development. Traditionally, financial institutions and insurance companies used risk21
management techniques to hedge financial risk exposures.
Risk
managers at those companies would analyze the specific type of risk
assigned to them (e.g., credit, market, foreign currency, etc.) and de22
sign or purchase financial products to mitigate that risk. Risk managers rarely discussed or assessed the company’s overall risk profile;
rather, risk management was confined to separate and individual si23
los. Any meaningful consideration of risk management was even
rarer outside of the financial and insurance industries. ERM seeks to
address these limitations. This Part provides an overview of the ERM
theory, its application in practice, and its perceived role in the 2008
recession.

18

DAMODARAN, supra note 13, at 5–6.
“Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; everything that
counts cannot necessarily be counted.” Albert Einstein. See also NASSIM NICHOLAS
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007) (discussing
challenges of identifying and addressing surprise risk events); CROWE HORWATH,
AVOIDING THE BLACK SWAN: BARRIERS TO IMPROVING RISK MANAGEMENT (2009), available at http://www.cfo.com/whitepapers/index.cfm/download/14467404 (describing
a study showing challenges with risk management highlighted by the 2008 recession,
including surprise risk events).
20
As discussed below, COSO introduced its first proposal for a comprehensive
risk management or ERM framework in 2004. See COSO REPORT, supra note 15; see
also infra Part II.A.
21
See, e.g., DAMODARAN, supra note 13, at 3–5 (describing origins of risk management); DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT’S BROKEN
AND HOW TO FIX IT 21–35 (2009) (same); THOMAS L. BARTON ET AL., MAKING
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT PAY OFF 11 (2002) (discussing silo approach to risk
management); Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management
and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 581 (2008) (same); see also CFO
RESEARCH SERVS. & IBM CORP., THINKING THROUGH UNCERTAINTY: CFOS SCRUTINIZE
NON-FINANCIAL
RISK
4
(2007),
available
at
https://www935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/ibm-risk-mgmt-final-032807.pdf (exploring
proposition that “[c]ompanies seek a more expansive view of the risks that place
their business performance in jeopardy”). For an explanation of the financial risk
modeling technique commonly used by firms, called “Value at Risk” or VaR, and
viewed as flawed in the context of the 2008 recession, see Nocera, supra note 3.
22
See, e.g., Gabriele Sabato, Financial Crisis: Where Did Risk Management Fail?, at 3–
4, available at http://www.fma.org/NY/Papers/Financial_crisis_RM_failure_final.pdf.
23
See supra note 21.
19
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A. Development of ERM
Although the Barings Bank and Long-Term Capital Management meltdowns highlighted risk-management flaws, it was the
Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate scandals of the early 2000s
24
that sparked a call for more comprehensive risk management. For
example, in describing the internal controls adopted by Enron to
manage risks associated with related-party transactions, the report of
the Enron Special Investigation Committee observed that the “controls as designed were not rigorous enough, and their implementation and oversight was inadequate at both the Management and
25
Board levels.” The report concluded that Enron’s board failed “to
demand more information, and . . . to probe and understand the in26
formation that did come to it.” The response to Enron and similar
governance failures was swift and emerged in at least two separate
forms: new risk-related disclosure regulations and redefined best
27
practices.
Risk-related regulations were included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, the listing standards for the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”), and the U.S. Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines.
The most extensive of these regulations is section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires management to explain and assess
the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial
28
reporting. Section 406 of the Act also requires reporting companies

24

See generally Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J.
417 (2008) (discussing the business practices leading to the Enron scandal and the
Congressional actions that followed); Robert Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate
Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003) (discussing the corporate
governance problems of Enron as a redesigned corporation and its risk-management
practices); J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (2003)
(discussing Worldcom’s fraud and bankruptcy and the implications on the telecommunications industry); see also supra note 1.
25
WILLIAM C. POWERS JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 10 (2002),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/index.html.
26
Id. at 23. The United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
reached similar conclusions, faulting Enron’s board for approving “new business ventures and complex transactions” with insufficient information and oversight. See Rosen, supra note 24, at 1170.
27
See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Foreword: After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the
Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 229 (2003) (explaining the events leading up to the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the regulatory and legislative
responses).
28
See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 142 (2006) (explaining the
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to adopt a code of ethics for its senior officers or explain why it does
29
not have a code. The NYSE listing standards address both internal
controls and codes of ethics and specifically identifies risk assessment
30
as an audit committee responsibility.
Moreover, the Sentencing
Guidelines offer reduced penalties for companies that demonstrate
effective compliance programs that, among other things, incorporate
31
ongoing risk assessment practices.
To assist companies in meeting these various requirements, the
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”) developed a more comprehensive framework for risk32
management practices referred to as ERM. COSO defines ERM as
[A] process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across
the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity
33
objectives.
impact of the Act, including Section 404 on corporations); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003) (same).
29
See 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006); Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished:
Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 367, 380–81 (2008) (exploring the requirements of Section 406); see also
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1202–03 (2003) (discussing various requirements of the
Act, including the code of ethics).
30
See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL; Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative
Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003) (explaining and analyzing changes to listing standards).
31
See generally David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes Oxley & the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781 (2007) (explaining and analyzing changes to sentencing guidelines); David Hess et al., The 2004 Amendments to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725 (2006).
32
A detailed explanation of the components of ERM is beyond the scope of this
Article. Nevertheless, the COSO report contains those details and additional information. See COSO REPORT, supra note 15. In certain respects, ERM resembles prior
organizational literature by emphasizing the need to restructure how firms conceive
and utilize knowledge, information, and channels of communication. See, e.g., JAMES
CHAMPY & MICHAEL HAMMER, REENGINEERING THE CORPORATION: A MANIFESTO FOR
BUSINESS REVOLUTION (2003); PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE—THE ART AND
PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990); PETER M. SENGE ET AL., THE DANCE
OF CHANGE: THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINING MOMENTUM IN LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS
(1999). ERM tries, however, to offer a simplified process for implementing the necessary changes and improving firm culture and governance. See infra Part II.B. Although initial reports suggest that ERM is effective, the longevity of the movement
remains to be seen. See supra note 4; infra notes 52–55.
33
COSO REPORT, supra note 15, at 2 (emphasis in original); see Kirkpatrick, supra
note 3, at 7. Federal Reserve Bank Governor Susan Bies defined ERM as “a process
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ERM is a holistic approach to risk management that considers strategic and operational risks in addition to financial risks and focuses on
34
identifying, assessing, and responding to risk events.
35
ERM takes a top-down approach to risk management. COSO
and other commentators stress the importance of the board’s and se36
nior management’s role in ERM. Under this framework, the board
and senior management are critical in creating a risk culture at the
firm (i.e., a culture that values and rewards meaningful assessment
37
and communication regarding risk events). The board also plays an
important role in setting the firm’s risk appetite and designing and

that enables management to deal effectively with uncertainty and the associated risk
and opportunity, enhancing the capacity to build stakeholder value.” Susan Schmidt
Bies, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the National Credit Union Administration 2007
Risk Mitigation Summit on Enterprise Risk Management and Mortgage Lending
(Jan. 11, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/Bies20070111a.htm).
34
ERM generally targets all potential risk events, including financial risks, operational risks, business risks, litigation risks, and governance and human resource risks.
See, e.g., CAROLYN KAY ET AL., [CONFERENCE BD.], THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS
IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 11 (2006) [hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT],
available at http://www.ucop.edu/riskmgt/erm/documents/role_uscorpboards.pdf;
see also Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 584 (“Under ERM, risks can be viewed as
falling into two broad areas: core risks (risks which a firm should have a competitive
advantage to handle in their business model) and non-core risks (risks which could
be hedged by the business or transferred through risk management techniques).”).
“ERM consists of eight interrelated components, which are derived from the way
management runs an enterprise and integrated with the management process: (1)
internal environment, (2) objective setting, (3) event identification, (4) risk assessment, (5) risk response, (6) control activities, (7) information and communication,
and (8) monitoring.” Bies, supra note 33; COSO REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–4.
35
See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N (COSO),
STRENGTHENING ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT FOR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE 4–5, 17
(2009), available at http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO_09_board_position
_final102309PRINTandWEBFINAL.pdf [hereinafter COSO PAPER]; RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 9.
36
CONFERENCE BD., EMERGING GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT 8–9, 13–17 (2007); CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 34, at 15–18;
see also infra Part III.A.
37
John Michael Farrell & Angela Hoon, What’s Your Company’s Risk Culture?,
NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRECTORS DIRECTORSHIP, April 15, 2009, available at
http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/index.php/articles/entry/risk-culture-companies
(“Risk culture is the system of values and behaviors present in an organization that
shapes risk decisions of management and employees.”); Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mares, IIF’s Final Report on Market Best Practices for Financial Institutions and Financial Products, BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP., Sept. 2008, at 1 (“Cultivation of a
consistent ‘risk culture’ throughout firms is the most important element in risk management.”); COSO PAPER, supra note 35, at 4–5.
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38

monitoring the firm’s ERM program.
Many commentators view
COSO’s ERM framework as best practices in business riskmanagement practices.
Notably, despite the regulatory and industry endorsements for
enhanced risk-management practices, corporate boards voiced resis39
tance to the concept. Many directors opined that extensive riskmanagement procedures were unnecessary or too cumbersome; oth40
ers resisted any mandated approach to risk management. Studies
suggest that these sentiments linger in corporate boardrooms even
41
after the 2008 recession.
B. Implementation of ERM
The design and implementation of ERM is firm specific but generally involves the board of directors and senior management first
mapping the firm’s business strategies and risks. “Developing an understanding of the linkages between top risk exposures and key strategies and objectives can help both management . . . and risk over-

38

See, e.g., Barker, supra note 3 (explaining that boards should “(i) evaluat[e] the
risks associated with corporate strategies, (ii) defin[e] the risk appetite of the company, [and] (iii) ensur[e] that appropriate resources are devoted to risk identification, avoidance, and mitigation”); CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 34, at 6–7
(recommending six primary tasks for boards considering ERM); COSO REPORT, supra note 15, at 6–7 (defining role of board in ERM).
39
See RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 6; Richard Clune, ERM: A Status Report,
INTERNAL AUDITOR, Feb. 1, 2005, available at http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/
documents/ERMJFAPaper21306.pdf (describing a study finding that less than half
of respondents adopted ERM-like procedures); Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at
584–85 (“Evidence from studies and surveys indicates that, to date, only about 10%
of major companies claim to have implemented many aspects of ERM, while almost
all the others claim that they plan to do so in the future.”).
40
See, e.g., CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 34, at 18 (noting that “many
directors interviewed resisted what they termed ‘an excessively formal’ way to incorporate risk management into their deliberations”).
41
See, e.g., HORWATH, supra note 19, at 4 (describing a study finding that onethird of respondents view risk management “as an unnecessary interference with
business activities”); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
BENCHMARKING SURVEY 6 (2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/fi_FI
/fi/julkaisut/tiedostot/erm_benchmarking_survey_2008.pdf (explaining that approximately 31% of respondents did not have risk management practices in place);
Audit Committees Put Risk Management at the Top of Their Agendas, KPMG (June 16,
2008), http://www.kpmg.co.uk/news/detail.cfm?pr=3120 (describing a study finding
that only 46% of respondents were very satisfied with risk practices); Financial Crisis
Intensifies Interest in Risk Management Among CFOs, TOWERS PERRIN (Sept. 2008),
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/showdctmdoc.jsp?country=global&url=Master_Bra
nd_2/USA/News/Spotlights/2008/Sept/2008_09_30_spotlight_cfo_survey.htm (explaining that “72% of respondents expressed concern about their own company’s
risk management practices and ability to meet strategic plans”).
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sight by identifying where risks are overlapping within an individual
42
strategy and where certain risks may affect multiple strategies.” With
this information, the board and management can evaluate the firm’s
portfolio of key risks—assessing the impact and likelihood of each
43
risk event—and set the firm’s risk appetite.
The core elements of the ERM program then revolve around efficient and effective communication channels and active monitoring
44
of the firm’s risks against its risk portfolio and risk appetite. Commentators stress the need for risk managers to have direct access to
the board and multiple contact points to encourage the free-flow of
information and reduce the likelihood that risk reports are presented
45
but not heard. Firms also are encouraged to develop key risk indicators that facilitate more effective monitoring of potential risk
46
events.
C. ERM and the 2008 Recession
The 2008 recession revealed significant weaknesses in existing
47
risk-management practices. Risk-management failures alone did not
trigger the recession, but many commentators identify such failures
as contributing to the severity of the economic losses. For example,
Chairman Ben Bernanke stated: “Among other things, our analysis
reaffirms that capital adequacy, effective liquidity planning, and
strong risk management are essential for safe and sound banking;
the . . . [recession] revealed serious deficiencies on the part of some

42

COSO PAPER, supra note 35, at 13.
Id. at 14–15.
44
Id.
45
See supra Part II.A and infra Part III.A.
46
COSO PAPER, supra note 35, at 17–18 (“Key risk indicators . . . are metrics used
by some organizations to provide an early signal of increasing risk exposure in various areas of organization.”).
47
Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 7 (“Despite the importance given to risk management by regulators and corporate governance principles, the financial turmoil has
revealed severe shortcomings in practices both in internal management and in the
role of the board in overseeing risk management systems at a number of banks.”); see
also supra note 3. For example, a study revealed that risk managers at UBS AG were
aware of potential losses in the firm’s subprime mortgage holdings in early 2007 but
did not advise senior executives of these potential losses until July 2007. Kirkpatrick,
supra note 3, at 11. Moreover, UBS’s board did not learn of the firm’s financial situation until August 2007. Id. at 11–12. UBS subsequently acknowledged that “[a]s a
result of [risk management] weaknesses, the firm failed to adequately assess correlated risks and risk concentrations.” UBS AG, ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 20-F FOR
2009, at 120 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ubs.com/1/e/
investors/sec_filings.html.
43
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48

financial institutions in one or more of the areas.” Similarly, the
Chairman of Morgan Stanley, John Mack, testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that “[i]n retrospect, many firms were
too highly leveraged, took on too much risk and did not have sufficient resources to manage those risks effectively in a rapidly changing
49
environment.”
Although it is difficult to pinpoint one key deficiency in existing
risk-management practices, a lack of integration and communication
50
appears to be one of the most significant problems. The traditional
segregated approach to risk management prevented many firms from
understanding their true exposure if various identified risks converged and from communicating those risks efficiently to senior ex51
ecutives and directors. Consequently, firms’ responses to the changing financial landscape during 2007–2008 were slow and in many
cases too late.
At least one study suggests that financial institutions with more
integrated risk-management programs performed better during the
52
2008 recession. The study posits that these firms communicated information throughout the organization more efficiently and were
53
able to implement necessary changes more effectively. A nimble re54
sponse to a risk event can preserve significant value. More studies
and data are needed to evaluate fully the impact of ERM, but initial
studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that ERM provides more time48
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 7,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20090507a.htm).
49
Highlights: Quotes from U.S. Financial Crisis Commission Hearing, REUTERS, Jan. 13,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C3AI20100113.
50
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 8–12.
51
See Harner, supra note 3, at 50–51 (describing silo approach to risk management and its role in the 2008 recession).
52
SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
DURING
THE
RECENT
MARKET
TURBULENCE
(2008),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/ssg_risk_mgt_doc_fin
al.pdf. The study concluded that “[f]irms that avoided . . . [significant] problems
demonstrated a comprehensive approach to viewing firm-wide exposures and risk,
sharing quantitative and qualitative information more efficiently across the firm and
engaging in more effective dialogue across the management team.” Id.; see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 8 (summarizing findings of the Senior Supervisors Group
Study).
53
See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 52.
54
See, e.g., RIMS Paper, supra note 3, at 3–4 (explaining the impact of risk management failures on firms during the 2008 recession and how to address those issues).

HARNER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1336

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/8/2010 4:00 PM

[Vol. 40:1323

ly information to boards and senior management and thus may better
55
equip them to respond both proactively and reactively to risk events.
III. RISK-MANAGEMENT REPONSES TO THE 2008 RECESSION
By most accounts, the 2008 recession was the most significant re56
cession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The economic
losses were steep and the recovery slow. The International Monetary
Fund estimates that global financial institutions lost approximately
$4.05 trillion in value, with $2.7 trillion of that relating to loans origi57
nating in the United States. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the United States lost approximately 8.4 million jobs during the recession, with the U.S. unemployment rate hovering
58
between nine to ten percent since 2009.
Not surprisingly, policymakers and commentators are scrutinizing the causes of the 2008 recession and searching for ways to avoid,
59
or at least mitigate, the next economic downturn. Some of this discussion has focused on risk management and improving firms’ risk55

See, e.g., Kurt A. Desender, The Influence of Board Composition, Audit Fees
and Ownership Concentration on Enterprise Risk Management (Oct. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1025982 (exploring value components of ERM); Robert E. Hoyt & Andre
P. Liebenberg, The Value of Enterprise Risk Management 1 (July 29, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1440947 (describing a study finding “a positive relation between firm
value and the use of ERM”); see also supra notes 39–41.
56
“The financial market crisis that erupted in August 2007 has developed into
the largest financial shock since the Great Depression, inflicting heavy damage on
markets and institutions at the core of the financial system.” INT’L MONETARY FUND,
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HOUSING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 4 (2008), available at
http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf.
57
Mark Landler, I.M.F. Puts Bank Losses from Global Financial Crisis at $4.1 Trillion,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/
business/global/22fund.html.
58
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
February 2010, at 1–2 (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/empsit.pdf.
59
See, e.g., Patrice Hill, CEOs Trade Blame with Congress over Financial Crisis, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2010/jan/14/ceos-trade-blame-with-congress-over-finance-crisis/
(“Wall
Street
clashed with Washington on Wednesday over the causes of the biggest financial crisis
since the Great Depression, with political leaders and financial chieftains trying to
cast the blame on each other.”); Dawn Kopecki & Matthew Leising, Derivatives Industry Gets Second Look from Congress, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2009, 11:45 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aTZhIZJYCeS8 (“Congress will take a second shot at the derivatives industry after its decision nine years
ago to forgo regulations led to a $592 trillion market that brought financial firms to
their knees.”).
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60

management practices. This Part highlights the developments regarding risk management as a result of the 2008 recession. As discussed below, industry proponents are encouraging more attention
to ERM, while regulatory responses focus on enhanced disclosure regarding risk management and governing risk through executive
compensation schemes. Part V then considers how neither approach
fully accounts for the behavioral and cultural barriers to effective risk
management.
A. ERM as a Potential Solution
In a speech in January 2007, Federal Reserve Bank Governor Susan Bies stated, “A successful enterprise risk-management process can
help an organization meet many of [its] challenges by providing a
framework within which managers can explicitly consider how the
61
organization’s risk exposures are changing.”
Governor Bies discussed the importance of ERM not only in the context of large financial institutions and subprime-lending practices but also as universal
62
principles valuable to firms of all sizes in all industries. As she explained,
[W]hether someone is designing a new branch office, shipping
tapes to a backup site for storage, developing the layout for a
newspaper ad, or training new employees, they [should] consciously think about risk as one of the elements of that business
activity. Increased risk awareness by staff throughout the enter63
prise is integral to managing risk successfully.

Many commentators agree with Governor Bies’ focus on firmwide risk responsibility and the creation of a risk culture within firms
as a response to the 2008 recession. In 2009, COSO issued a thought
paper, titled Strengthening Enterprise Risk Management for Strategic Advantage, to assist boards in strengthening risk-management practices
and complying with anticipated regulatory mandates on risk man-

60
See, e.g., Mary Schapiro, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Council of Institutional Investors (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch040609mls.htm. (“The Commission will be considering whether greater
disclosure is needed about how a company — and the company’s board in particular
— manages risks, both generally and in the context of setting compensation.”).
61
Bies, supra note 33. Governor Bies identified those challenges as including
“emerging technologies and business processes, new financial instruments, the growing scale and scope of financial institutions, and changing regulatory frameworks.”
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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agement, such as the SEC rule on proxy disclosure enhancement.
Much of the thought paper discusses the importance of the board’s
65
role in ERM and provides guidance for boards in fulfilling that role.
COSO explains that “[b]ecause management is accountable to the
board of directors, the board’s focus on effective risk oversight is critical to setting the tone and culture towards effective risk management
through strategy setting, formulating high-level objectives, and ap66
proving broad-based resource allocations.”
Specifically, COSO identifies four areas of risk-related tasks for
boards: (1) “[d]iscuss risk-management philosophy and risk appetite;” (2) “[u]nderstand enterprise risk-management practices;” (3)
“[r]eview portfolio of risks in relation to risk appetite;” and (4) “[b]e
67
apprised of the most significant risks and related responses.” This
type of board involvement provides more information to directors
and can help them better understand the overall business enterprise.
It also signals to management and others at the firm the importance
of risk responsibility and the need to align the firm’s risk appetite
with its business strategies.
Other commentators suggest that ERM, as opposed to more traditional financial risk management, can facilitate a more complete
risk assessment that captures at some level what generally is viewed as
unquantifiable risk. Speaking to this point, the Risk and Insurance
Management Society, Inc. (“RIMS”) observed, “A number of actuaries, financial managers and consultants regularly advocate a primarily ‘scientific’ and quantifiable approach for enterprise risk management. Certain financial institutions seem to have replaced sound
68
business judgment with this ‘scientific’ approach.” RIMS perceives
ERM as a means of reintroducing sound business judgment to the
risk-management process, allowing firms to identify and respond

64

See COSO PAPER, supra note 35. For a discussion of the SEC rule on proxy disclosure enhancement, see infra Part II.B.1.
65
See COSO PAPER, supra note 35.
66
Id. at 4.
67
Id. at 5.
68
RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 5. RIMS faults over-reliance on historic controls
and risk metrics for some of the losses experienced during the 2008 recession. Id. at
6. It posits that “[t]here was a failure to embed enterprise risk management best
practices from the top all the way down to the trading floor, with the mistaken assumption that there is only one way to view a particular risk.” Id. at 7; see also Nocera,
supra note 3, at 9 (discussing flaws in relying solely on VaR and noting that, in the
context of the 2008 recession, “[i]nstead of scrutinizing VaR for signs of impending
trouble, they took comfort in a number and doubled down, putting more money at
risk in the expectation of bigger gains”).

HARNER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/8/2010 4:00 PM

BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT

1339

more effectively and efficiently to both quantifiable and unquantifia69
ble risks.
A report prepared for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reached similar conclusions regarding
70
the 2008 recession and the value of ERM in that context. The report urges more emphasis on the corporate governance or human
component of risk management and suggests ERM as a technique for
71
achieving that objective. Among other things, the report stresses
the need for better understanding of and communication regarding
risks, noting that “[e]ven if risk-management systems in the technical
sense are functioning, it will not impact the company unless the
transmission of information is through effective channels, a clear
72
corporate governance issue.”
In addition, Standard & Poor’s has integrated ERM assessment
73
into its ratings analysis. For example, Standard & Poor’s is inter74
viewing its rated, nonfinancial issuers regarding their ERM practices.
The questions asked during these interviews concern: (1) the company’s process for identifying top risks; (2) how often that process
takes place; (3) how those risks are managed; (4) who is responsible
for risk management; (5) the board’s role in risk management; and
(6) how the company has responded to unexpected information in
75
its industry. Standard & Poor’s and ERM proponents generally view
69

RIMS PAPER, supra note 3.
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 4.
71
Id. at 2 (“The risk management systems have failed in many cases due to corporate governance procedures rather than the inadequacy of computer models
alone: information about exposures in a number of cases did not reach the board
and even senior levels of management, while risk management was often activity rather than enterprise-based.”).
72
Id. at 11.
73
Big Changes in Standard & Poor’s Rating Criteria, STANDARD & POOR’S,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/erm/en/us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010)
(“Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services has expanded its review of the financial service
industry’s enterprise risk management (ERM) practices.”).
74
See, e.g., Dreyer & Balic, supra note 16, at 2 (“Since the third quarter of last
year, our analysts
have begun to incorporate specific ERM discussions into their regular meetings with
the companies we rate, focusing on risk-management culture and strategic-risk management as two universally applicable aspects of ERM.”); AON GLOBAL RISK
CONSULTING, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: S&P ENHANCEMENT WHITE PAPER 3
(2009), available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments
/risk-services/enterprise_risk_management_enhancement_white_paper.pdf [hereinafter AON PAPER].
75
See, e.g., Dreyer & Balic, supra note 16, at 2–3 (identifying seven key questions
for company interviews and noting that Standard & Poor’s “analysts have explored
managements’ views of the most consequential risks that their firms face, their like70
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the ERM framework as an important tool for mitigating future economic downturns through better information flow and core cultural
76
changes.
B. Risk-Related Policy
Even before the extent of the 2008 recession was apparent, U.S.
federal financial regulatory agencies issued Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (“Interagency Guidance”)
that emphasized the importance of risk management with respect to
77
nontraditional mortgage products, including subprime mortgages.
The Interagency Guidance, dated September 29, 2006, observed that
“risk layering, combined with the broader marketing of nontraditional mortgage loans, exposes financial institutions to increased risk rel78
ative to traditional mortgage loans.” It urged financial institutions
to adopt rigorous risk-management practices that closely monitor the
volume and volatility of nontraditional mortgage loan originations
79
and investments. Among other guidelines, it suggested that financial institutions “[m]aintain capital at levels that reflect portfolio characteristics and the effect of stressed economic conditions on collec80
tability.”
Nevertheless, many financial institutions failed to implement the
types of controls, monitoring, and communication procedures recommended by the Interagency Guidance. For example, despite the
warning that nontraditional mortgage products may not perform well
in a stressed environment, and that firms should consider collectability issues, many financial institutions did not account for a decline in
81
the housing market in their financial risk modeling.
Likewise,
lihood of occurring, how these top risks are identified, monitored, and updated, and
the influence of risk sensitivity on liability management and financing decisions”);
AON PAPER, supra note 74, at 4.
76
See, e.g., Dreyer & Balic, supra note 16, at 2 (explaining the purpose of ERM
consideration); AON PAPER, supra note 74, at 4.
77
Memorandum from Scott M. Albinson to Chief Executive Officers, Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (Oct. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/25244.pdf.
78
Id. at 2.
79
Id. at 1–2, 4.
80
Id. at 6.
81
See, e.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made
TIMES,
Nov.
23,
2008,
at
A1,
available
at
Bolder
Bets,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?pagewanted=1
(“Citigroup’s risk models never accounted for the possibility of a national housing downturn, this person said, and the prospect that millions of homeowners could default
on their mortgages.”); Nocera, supra note 3, at 10 (“The fact that [risk models]
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communication between risk managers and senior management was
delayed, incomplete, or both.
In response, policymakers introduced several risk-related initiatives, and the courts weighed in on the issue as well. As discussed below, many of the regulatory responses focus on increased disclosure
regarding risk-management practices and regulating risk through restrictions on executive compensation schemes. This Part also discusses the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in the Citigroup litigation, which posits a low threshold for boards’ risk oversight
responsibilities and, consequently, may underscore the need to explore disclosure, executive compensation, and other alternative
means to help regulators and markets monitor firms’ riskmanagement practices.
1.

Proposed or Adopted Regulatory Responses

In May 2009, Senator Charles Schumer introduced the Share82
holder Bill of Rights Act of 2009 in the Senate (“Shareholder Bill”).
The stated purpose of the Shareholder Bill was “[t]o provide shareholders with enhanced authority over the nomination, election, and
83
compensation of public company executives.”
Section 5 of the
Shareholder Bill provides that reporting companies shall “establish a
risk committee, comprised entirely of independent directors, which
shall be responsible for the establishment and evaluation of the risk
84
management practices of the issuer.”
In addition, in December 2009, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) addressed risk-management practices in its final
85
rule on proxy disclosure enhancement. The rule requires reporting
companies to discuss their general risk-management practices and

didn’t measure the possibility of an extreme event was a blessing to the executives. It
made black swans all the easier to ignore.”); Eric S. Rosengren, Fed. Reserve Boston,
Address at The Global Interdependence Center’s Conference on Financial Interdependence in the World’s Post-Crisis Capital Markets (Mar. 3, 2010) (transcript available
at
http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2010/030310/index.htm)
(“There is evidence that financial institutions understood the risks that would arise if
house prices fell, but assigned too low a probability to this potential outcome. Thus
they were woefully unprepared to weather the consequences when prices did indeed
fall.”).
82
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009).
83
Id. § 5.
84
Id.
85
Final Rule: Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68334-01 (Dec. 16,
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 249).
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86

how their compensation schemes relate to risk profiles.
It also
mandates a disclosure regarding the board’s role in and oversight of
87
risk management. The SEC posits that “disclosure about the board’s
involvement in the oversight of the risk management process should
provide important information to investors about how a company
perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the
board and senior management in managing the material risks facing
88
the company.”
Also in December 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Wall Street Reform Act and Consumer Protection Act of
89
2009 (“Wall Street Act”). The Wall Street Act addresses risk man90
agement in the context of executive compensation. Specifically, it
grants regulators extensive authority to assess whether a firm’s compensation scheme “is aligned with sound risk management” and “to
prescribe joint regulations prohibiting any feature of any incentive91
based arrangement that encourages such inappropriate risks.” Other regulations relate risk to executive compensation and seek to con92
trol risk through firms’ compensation schemes.

86

Id. at 68336-7.
Id. at 68344-45.
88
Id. at 68345.
89
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2009).
90
Id.
91
Id. § 2004.
92
For example, the TARP legislation and the Federal Reserve Bank’s proposed
guidance on incentive compensation practices also seek to ensure that compensation
incentives do not encourage inappropriate risk taking. For a thoughtful discussion
of those and other regulations governing risk through compensation practices, see
Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk-Taking 13–21 (Mar. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1562018&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter. Although this Article
does not focus on the relation between risk and compensation structures, that factor
is an important consideration in designing and evaluating any risk management program, including ERM. Several commentators have addressed this relationship. See,
e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247
(2010); Douglas O. Edwards, Comment, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk
Management Incentives After the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247
(2010); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 183 (2009); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensation for Risk Regulation (Mar. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546229.
87
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The Judicial Response

As discussed above, several proposed regulatory responses to the
93
2008 recession focus on executive compensation. The relation between risk and executive compensation is an important component
94
of any risk-management program, including ERM.
Several commentators, however, have observed significant flaws in trying to reduce risk and achieve financial stability through compensation
95
96
reform.
In fact, such an approach appears incomplete at best.
Nonetheless, public outrage over executive compensation during the
2008 recession and the perceived difficulty in enhancing board oversight duties under state law likely influenced the compensationreform approach.
Consider the views of the Delaware Chancery Court in the In re
97
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation. The court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs’ allegations that “director defendants breached their duty of oversight ei93

See supra Part III.B.1.
See Daniel K. Tarullo, Fed. Reserve, Address at the University of Maryland’s
Robert H. Smith School of Business Roundtable on Executive Compensation: Practices
and
Reforms
(Nov.
2,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20091102a.htm) (explaining that “some firms gave loan officers incentives to write a lot of loans, or traders
incentives to generate high levels of trading revenues, without sufficient regard for
the risks associated with those activities,” and that those incentives undermine “the
very foundation of sound risk management”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 14 (discussing components of compensation that might encourage short-termism and risk
taking and noting that “the system of bonuses in investment banking provides incentives for substantial risk taking while also allowing no flexibility for banks to reduce
costs when they have to: at the upper end, the size of the bonus is unlimited while at
the lower end it is limited to zero”); see also Aligning Risk Management and Executive
Compensation, ENTERPRISE RISK MGMT. INITIATIVE, Dec. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/index.php/articles/entry/aligning-executivecompensation (“A 2008 study conducted by The Wall Street Journal and ERI Economic Research Institute found that the median CEO salary of a Standard and Poor’s
500 company increased 20.5 percent from the previous year while corporate revenues increased only 2.8 percent.”); Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 92, at 21–25
(discussing additional empirical studies analyzing links between executive compensation and firm performance).
95
See Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 92, at 26–44 (criticizing prevailing views
that “excessive” risk can be controlled through compensation-related reform on both
functional and completeness grounds and discussing the difficulty with defining excessive risk and when regulating that risk might be socially desirable).
96
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 14–15 (explaining that alignment between
compensation practices and long-term interests of firm does not necessarily improve
risk assessment and noting that “one study . . . reports that financial institutions that
collapsed had a CEO with high stock holdings so that they should normally have
been risk averse, whereas the ones that survived had strong incentives to take risks”).
97
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
94
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ther because the oversight mechanisms were not adequate or because
the director defendants did not make a good faith effort to comply
98
with the established oversight procedures.”
The court discussed
those allegations under the standard articulated in In re Caremark In99
100
ternational Inc. Derivative Litigation, Guttman v. Huang, and Stone v.
101
Ritter. The court explained that “[t]he presumption of the business
judgment rule, the protection of an exculpatory § 102(b)(7) provision, and the difficulty of proving a Caremark claim together function
to place an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for
personal director liability for a failure to see the extent of a compa102
ny’s business risk.”
The Delaware Chancery Court’s reluctance to impose liability on
Citigroup’s directors for allegedly failed or inadequate riskmanagement practices is consistent with the general notion that
business decisions should be made in the boardroom and not the
103
courtroom. It also reflects the complexity of assessing business risk
and the delicate balance between risk and return. As Chancellor
Chandler stated, “Business decision-makers must operate in the real
world, with imperfect information, limited resources, and an uncertain future. To impose liability on directors for making a ‘wrong’
business decision would cripple their ability to earn returns for inves104
tors by taking business risks.”
Although no liability resulted in the Citigroup case, the conduct
of Citigroup and the individuals responsible for its risk-management
activities prior to and during the 2008 recession make for a compelling case study. The information available to Citigroup’s executives

98

Id. at 127.
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
100
823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
101
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). ’Under this precedent, plaintiffs generally must
show “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists.” In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. For an excellent discussion of these three cases
and their relation to failure to monitor claims, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark
and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009).
102
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125.
103
See, e.g., Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 957 F.2d 203, 207
(5th Cir. 1992) (“Under this familiar rule of American jurisprudence, the courts refrain from second guessing business decisions made by corporate directors in the absence of a showing of fraud, unfairness or overreaching.”);Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (“The judges are not business experts.”); see also Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83,
95–100 (2004) (discussing development of business judgment rule).
104
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126.
99
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and how they used that information provides insight into corporate
risk assessment and highlights cultural norms that may impede meaningful ERM.
IV. A CASE STUDY: CITIGROUP INC.
Citigroup Inc. is a storied financial services firm. With roots dating to 1812, Citigroup “has approximately 200 million customer ac105
counts and does business in more than 140 countries.” It provides a
variety of financial products and services to its customers, including
“consumer banking, credit cards, corporate and investment banking,
106
securities brokerage and wealth management.”
Citigroup carries
approximately $1.857 trillion of assets and approximately $1.702 tril107
lion of liabilities on its balance sheet.
The 2008 recession hit Citigroup hard, notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, its massive scope and size. It experienced losses of
108
approximately $10 billion by the start of the fourth quarter of 2007,
109
and the losses continued into 2009.
Citigroup’s stock price
dropped precipitously as well, falling to below $4 per share in No110
vember 2008 and below $1 per share in March 2009.
As a result, Citigroup accepted assistance from the U.S. government under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”). Specifically, Citigroup received over $45 billion in capital infusions from the
government, and the government agreed to guarantee approximately
111
$306 billion in loans and securities. The government converted $25

105
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm.
106
Id. at 7.
107
Id. at 39.
108
See Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Posts Record Loss on $18 Billion Writedown,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2008, 4:25 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=apcQNeUgOLwA.
109
See Eric Dash, After Year of Heavy Losses, Citigroup Finds a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18,
2009,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/
business/18bank.html.
110
Dash & Creswell, supra note 81 (“Citigroup’s stock has plummeted to its lowest
price in more than a decade, closing Friday [November 2008] at $3.77.”); Laurie Kulikowski, Citigroup Shares in Rally Mode, THESTREET.COM (Mar. 9, 2010, 3:49 PM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10698901/1/citigroup-shares-in-rally-mode.html.
111
See, e.g., David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2008, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122747680752551447.html?mod=djemalertNEWS (explaining $45 capital infusion
and structure of U.S. loan guaranty).
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112

billion of its investment into Citigroup common stock.
Citigroup
113
repaid the remaining $20 billion in December 2009.
Prior to its participation in TARP, Citigroup, its CEO (Charles
Prince), its risk managers, and its board of directors made interesting
decisions. Despite various market and industry indications that the
subprime-mortgage market was deteriorating quickly in early 2007,
Citigroup stayed firmly committed to its large subprime mortgage
and collateralized-debt obligation (“CDO”) portfolios and related in114
vestment strategies. In fact, in July 2007, Mr. Prince brushed aside
these warnings and stated, “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got
115
to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”
Mr. Prince’s statement is not the only evidence that Citigroup as
an institution failed to appreciate or ignored the significance of the
subprime-mortgage crisis. Following the Bear Stearns collapse in the
summer of 2007, Citigroup assured the SEC that it anticipated no
116
subprime-mortgage losses.
One report suggests that Citigroup indicated that “the probability of those mortgages defaulting was so tiny
117
that they excluded them from their risk analysis.”
That approach
proved devastating in October 2007 when Citigroup announced that
“third-quarter profit would fall 60% from the prior year after huge
write-downs for unsold debt it issued to finance corporate takeovers
and for big losses on the value of subprime mortgage-backed securi118
ties.”
Standing alone, Citigroup’s position would not appear unreasonable. When placed in context with the other events of late 2006
and early 2007, however, the position becomes more troubling. Con-

112

See, e.g., Eric Dash, U.S. Agrees to Raise Its Stake in Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/business/
28deal.html.
113
See, e.g., Matthias Rieker, Citigroup, Wells Repay TARP Funds—Banks’ Ability to
Raise Capital is Sign of Health, Though Concerns About Financial Industry Linger, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 24, 2009, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704254604574614082322331944.html.
114
See, e.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 81 (explaining events leading up to Citigroup’s announcement of significant losses in October 2007).
115
Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs,
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc821c-0000779fd2ac.html.
116
See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81.
117
Id.
118
Greg Morcroft, Big Write-Downs to Slash Citi’s Quarterly Net 60%, WALL ST. J., Oct.
1, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/citigroup-says-quarterly-profit-to-drop60-but-shares-gain.
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sider the following sampling of information known by or available to
119
Citigroup executives:
• February 8, 2007: HSBC Holdings plc and New Century Financial Corp. announce concerns regarding performance of
their subprime-mortgage portfolios and perceived risks are re120
flected in ABX’s credit-default swap index.
• February 20, 2007: Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Bies observes that “‘[o]ne segment of [the mortgage market] . . . is starting to behave in a very problematic way and
121
that is the subprime adjustable rate mortgages.’”
• February 21, 2007: NovaStar Financial Inc. loses one-third of
122
its stock value due to subprime-mortgage issues.
• March 4, 2007: HSBC Holdings plc forced to take a $11 bil123
lion write-off to cover subprime-mortgage losses.
• March 12, 2007: Reports predict a significant surge in home
foreclosures and that “[t]he deepest housing decline in 16
124
years is about to get worse.”
• March 2007: Fremont General and New Century Financial
stop making loans, and “People’s Choice files for bankrupt125
cy.”
119

In addition to the sources noted below, information regarding this sample and
other events relating to the 2008 recession during this and additional periods is provided in several excellent sources. See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET CRISIS TIMELINE (July 2008), available at http://jec.senate.gov/
public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=4cdd7384-dbf6-40e6-adbc-789f69131903 [hereinafter
Economic Committee Timeline]; Edward Harrison, Banking Crisis Timeline, CREDIT
WRITEDOWNS,
available
at
http://www.creditwritedowns.com/credit-crisistimeline/banking-crisis-timeline (last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Timeline: Banking Crisis,
CNN (Oct. 16, 2008, 11:33 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/30/
us.bailout.timeline/index.html.
120
Jody Shenn & Shannon D. Harrington, Subprime Mortgage Bond Risks Surge, Index Suggests, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2007, 5:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601103&sid=a3ztUp9Z6_UE&refer=us.
121
Bad Mortgage Debt Not Widespread Problem, Fed Official Says, USATODAY.COM (Feb.
20, 2007, 3:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-0220-mortgage-debts-problems_x.htm.
122
Jody Shenn & Elizabeth Hester, NovaStar Sheds One-Third of Value After Posting
Loss, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2007, 4:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=NFI:US&sid=aKFh3Eockz2k.
123
John Waples & Grant Ringshaw, US Triggers $11bn HSBC Fall-Out, SUNDAY
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article1465662.ece.
124
Bob Ivry, Foreclosures May Hit 1.5 Million in U.S. Housing Bust, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
12, 2007, 4:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
sid=ahwzaBwuNaII&refer=home.
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• April 6, 2007: “American Home Mortgage writes down the
126
value of risky mortgages rated one step above subprime.”
• April 2007: New Century Financial files for bankruptcy, and
GMAC LLC and General Electric Co. announce massive reductions in workforce relating to subprime-mortgage busi127
nesses.
• May 3, 2007: UBS announces the closing of its hedge fund,
Dillon Read Capital Management, due to U.S. subprime128
mortgage losses.
• May 30, 2007: Report suggests manipulation in subprimemortgage market and notes that “[s]ince the beginning of
2006, more than 50 U.S. mortgage companies have put them129
selves up for sale, closed or declared bankruptcy.”
• June 12, 2007: Bear Stearns suspends redemptions at its
hedge funds, which posted an 18.97 percent loss in April
2007, and “RealtyTrac announces U.S. foreclosure filings
130
surged 90 percent in May from May 2006.”
• July 2007: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch “downgrade
bonds backed by subprime mortgages,” and Bear Stearns an131
nounces that its hedge funds are essentially worthless.
• July 18-19, 2007: Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Ben Bernanke acknowledges that “there will be ‘significant losses’ due

125

Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 24.
Id.
127
Rachel Layne & Greg Bensinger, GMAC, GE Will Cut 1,400 Job Cuts on Subprime
(Apr.
19,
2007,
7:56
PM),
Decline,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ammC8WlswFTQ&refer
=news; Top Lender in Chapter 11 Move, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2007, 4:14 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6519051.stm.
128
UBS to Close Its Hedge Fund Arm, BBC NEWS (May 3, 2007, 11:07 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6619033.stm.
129
Seth Lubove & Daniel Taub, Subprime Fiasco Exposes Manipulation by Mortgage
Brokerages, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=a8VFwgtdQ9FM. In addition, in April
and June 2007, Standard & Poor’s issued warnings about the acceleration in subprime mortgage payment defaults delinquencies. See Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing Before the H. SubComm. on Capital Markets, 109th Cong. 22
(2006) (testimony of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President, Standard & Poor’s
Credit Market Services).
130
Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Subprime Bath, BUSINESSWEEK, June 12, 2007,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2007/
db20070612_748264.htm; Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 23.
131
Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 22–23.
126
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to subprime mortgages” and that “the problems ‘likely will get
132
worse before they get better.’”
Admittedly, hindsight reveals information not always visible in
the moment, but Citigroup faced fairly stark evidence in early to mid133
2007. Citigroup’s inaction is perhaps even more striking given that
it held approximately $55 billion in U.S. subprime-mortgage assets at
134
the time. In addition, “Citigroup was the biggest CDO underwriter,
responsible for $46.9 billion of the securities sold in the first nine
135
months” of 2007. Those holdings also led to significant write-downs
136
in 2007.
The remainder of this Article considers the Citigroup scenario
in the context of ERM and proposed and potential regulatory responses to the perceived risk-management failures associated with the
137
2008 recession. It is easy to posit that better or more rigorous riskmanagement procedures would have prevented the losses that both
Citigroup shareholders and the markets more generally suffered, but
138
it is much harder to prove that proposition.
The existing law governing corporate boards’ compliance obligations and the basic behavioral and cultural barriers that impede many decision-making
139
processes only intensify that challenge

132

Id. at 22. Chairman Bernanke did observe that the subprime mortgage problems “have not spilled over into the greater system” and opined that the problems
were “‘bumps’ in ‘market innovations.’” Id.
133
See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (1998) (explaining
hindsight bias as “people over estimat[ing] the extent to which they could have predicted some future event (i.e., its foreseeability) once they learn what actually happened”); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[A]fter-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.”); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571,
576 (1998) (“Research by cognitive psychologists has shown that the folk wisdom on
hindsight is correct—past events seem more predictable than they really were.”).
134
Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Citi, SEC Are in Talks to Settle Asset Probe, WALL
ST. J., May 28, 2009, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124347855330961363.html.
135
Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Fires CDO Bankers After Mortgage Losses, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 19, 2007, 5:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aQmPC4T4g8Uo&refer=home.
136
Id.
137
See infra Part V.
138
Id.
139
See supra Part III.B.2 and infra Part V.
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V. POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO THE ERM SOLUTION
At its core, ERM strives to change corporate culture and improve
140
information and communication regarding risk events.
Those objectives alone, however, will not necessarily result in better risk man141
agement.
Indeed, a firm could implement a process that projects
an ERM façade but does nothing substantive to change the way decision makers consider and resolve risk issues. Moreover, that process
142
likely would satisfy existing and proposed risk regulations.
As discussed above, those regulations focus primarily on disclosure regarding risk-management practices and do not prescribe the content or
scope of those practices.
Accordingly, before firms adopt or policymakers mandate ERM,
or any other risk-management protocol, all participants need to consider whether more processes alone will improve risk management
and enhance firm value or whether something else is needed. Specifically, will more reporting and information necessarily result in different or better decisions? If not, how do we improve risk management and does the law have a role to play in that process?
A. Behavioral Barriers to Effective ERM
Why did Citigroup keep dancing well into 2007? Several key indicators in its industry and the economy more generally suggested
143
that caution was warranted. Some of its competitors observed these
indicators and instituted responsive measures. For example, J.P.
Morgan observed red flags in late 2006 and “exited the business of
144
securitizing subprime mortgages when it was still booming.” Other

140

See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
See Lipshaw, supra note 8, at 21 (“The problem with any reduction to rules . . .
is the illusion of objectivity, something fostered by the particular construct of concepts that constitutes law generally.”).
142
See supra Part III.B.
143
See supra Part IV.
144
Shawn Tully, Jamie Dimon’s Swat Team: How J.P. Morgan’s CEO and His Crew Are
Helping the Big Bank Beat the Credit Crunch, CNNMONEY (Sept. 2, 2008, 4:02 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/29/news/companies/tully_dimon.fortune.
J.P.
Morgan reportedly embraces ERM, focusing on structure and culture. See Enterprise
Risk Management, in THE CENTENNIAL GLOBAL BUSINESS SUMMIT REPORT 3–4 (Harvard
Business
School
2008),
available
at
http://www.hbs.edu/centennial/
businesssummit/global-business/enterprise-risk-management.pdf (explaining that,
at J.P. Morgan, “[r]isk management starts with tone set at the very top” and includes
“a culture of collaboration”); see also Cinderella’s Moment, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11,
2010, available at http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=15474145 (observing that financial institutions like J.P. Morgan that sur141
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investors actually grossed large profits during 2007 by shorting mort145
gage-backed securities.
But Citigroup remained committed to its
investment strategy, with little meaningful hedging, until arguably it
was too late.
It is difficult to discern with any precision the motivation for Citigroup’s conduct. Nevertheless, analyzing its course of action
through the lens of behavioral economics provides an interesting
146
perspective on risk management. Citigroup, like most financial institutions, had risk-management procedures in place prior to the
147
Its risk managers and executives had access to in2008 recession.
vived the recession better than their peers “relied largely on giving their riskmanaging roundheads equal status with the risk-taking cavaliers”).
145
See, e.g., RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 4 (“Goldman Sachs adjusted its positions
in mortgage-backed securities beginning in 2006, differentiating itself from the rest
of the market at a time when some might have criticized the move as excessively cautious.”). Goldman Sachs’ CFO explained: “In December [2006] our mortgage business lost money for 10 days in a row. It wasn’t a lot of money, but by the 10th day we
thought that we should sit down and talk about it.” Nocera, supra note 3, at 1. This
recognition reportedly led Goldman Sachs to rein in risk in its subprime mortgage
portfolio. Id.; see also Carol Loomis, Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted,
CNNMONEY (Nov. 28, 2007, 7:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/09/
news/newsmakers/merrill_rubin.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2007111119. Notably, Goldman Sachs has been criticized for, and is the subject of a lawsuit concerning, its products and investment decisions leading up to the 2008 recession. See John
D. McKinnon, Senate Probes Bank for Meltdown Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009, at C1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124890898142691729.html; Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud
in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm.
146
See Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), available at
https://www.msu.edu/course/aec/810/clippings/Thaler-behavioral%20
economics.pdf (“Behavioral economics is the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display
human limitations and complications.”); see also Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of Perceptions, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2006, available at http://harvardmagazine.com/
2006/03/the-marketplace-of-perce.html (explaining development of behavioral economics); Langevoort, supra note 133 (explaining role of behavioral economics in legal profession). But see, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring
Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 141 (2003) (suggesting that behavioral
economics can help create a more complete picture of the risk management problem and in turn a more complete solution; it is just one of several analytical tools that
policymakers can and should utilize in this analyze)(“The broader point is that cognitive biases, though sometimes enlightening, should be used as a last resort rather
than as a primary or all-purpose explanation for seemingly irrational behavior.”); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551, 1556-57 (1998) (criticizing behavioral economics).
147
See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 39–60 (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm (describing riskmanagement practices).
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formation that suggested significant potential risk to its major asset
148
portfolios. Yet, Citigroup consistently asserted that its risk exposure
149
was nominal.
The behavioral-economics literature documents unconscious
150
cognitive biases that might account for the Citigroup scenario.
Many commentators have thoughtfully analyzed the impact of individual and group biases on decisions by and relations among boards
151
of directors and senior management.
This Article considers three
of those biases in the risk-management context: confirmation bias,
overconfidence or optimism bias, and framing.
Confirmation bias commonly is defined as “the tendency to ascribe too much weight to evidence that confirms [individuals’ or
groups’] views and too little weight to evidence that invalidates their
148

See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., Joshua Gallu & Donald Griffin, SEC Says Prince, Ruben Knew of Losses on
Assets
at
Suit’s
Focus,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
9,
2010,
11:09
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-09/prince-rubin-knew-assets-at-focus-ofsec-claim-fueled-losses-agency-says.html (“The New York-based bank’s executives repeatedly stated in 2007 that it had reduced exposure to subprime mortgage securities
by 45 percent to $13 billion, as investors and analysts clamored for information about
the deteriorating market, according to the agency’s July complaint.”); Jim Zarroli,
Citigroup CEO Prince Falls to Subprime Debacle, NPR.ORG (Nov. 5, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15995002 (“Prince, 57, was
insisting jut a few months ago that Citigroup’s subprime exposure was not serious.”).
150
See, e.g., Inga Chira et al., Behavioral Bias Within the Decision Making Process, 6 J.
BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH 11 (2008) (“[Behavioral finance] draws on the psychology
and cognitive science literatures to examine why individual decision-making often
deviates from rational choices in systematic ways.”); Tversky and Kahneman, supra
note 10, at 1124 (“[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler
judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes
they lead to severe and systematic errors.”).
151
See, e.g., Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509
(2008); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92
MINN. L. REV. 323 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Psychology of Enron’s Demise]; Lynne L.
Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 19, 73–77 (1988); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002);
Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93
GEO. L.J. 285 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797, 812–13 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 101 (1997); Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance,
J. ECON. ISSUES, Sept. 2005, at 613; Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of
Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237.
149
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152

views.” Some commentators have identified instances of confirmation bias in corporate boardrooms, including the decision of Sun Microsystems to continue an aggressive investment strategy in the face
153
of an economic downturn.
This hubris encourages individuals on
an unconscious level to seek out information supporting their position and discount opposing views.
Citigroup’s risk supervisors were operating in an environment
that fostered confirmation bias. Reports suggest that Citigroup’s
trading supervisor, Thomas Maheras, relied on Citigroup’s ratings
from the ratings agencies to bolster his position that “the bank ‘would
154
never lose a penny.’”
Likewise, statements from Chairman Bernanke and others during this period provided support for his position. For example, in May 2007, Chairman Bernanke repeated his
March statements that “[t]he Federal Reserve does not foresee a
broader economic impact from the growing number of mortgage de155
faults.” Moreover, Mr. Prince, colleagues, and subordinates at Citigroup heavily relied on Mr. Maheras’ projections to continue their
156
public statements that the bank was financially sound.
152
Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 113, 118
(2001); see also Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12.
153
HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE: DECISIONS THAT CREATE
VALUE 3–10 (2007).
154
See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81. See also Bradley Keoun, Maheras Says Citigroup Expanded into CDOs at Urging of Bank’s Consultants, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7, 2010,
1:34
PM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-07/citigroup-consultantsurged-cdo-drive-maheras-says.html (“Even in the summer and fall of 2007, I continued to believe, based upon what I understood from the experts in the business, that
the bank’s super-senior CDO holdings were safe.”) (quoting Mr. Maheras).
155
Jeremy W. Peters, Fed Chief Addresses Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, May. 18, 2007, at
C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/business/18fed.html; see also
Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 22.
156
See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81. A related, but distinct bias, is commitment
bias. Irvis L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977). That hubris makes it difficult to
change course or exit a failing business strategy. In Citigroup’s scenario, Mr. Prince
committed to aggressive growth in Citigroup’s CDO products early in his tenure.
Dash & Creswell, supra note 81; see also Bradley Keoun, Citi’s Prince Says No One Saw
CDO
Losses
Coming,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
8,
2010,
2:26
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-08/prince-rubin-say-they-didn-trecognize-citigroup-s-cdo-risk-before-crisis.html (noting Citi’s executives’ CDO
growth strategy); Matt Pittman, Citigroup’s ‘Last Roman’ CDO Shows Enron Accounting,
BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2008, 4:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a42143EyVai8 (explaining one of Citigroup’s CDOs and
observing that “Citigroup Inc. created a $2.5 billion mortgage-backed security called
Bonifacius Ltd. in August as capital markets seized up and panic swept Wall Street”);
Zarroli, supra note 149 (“‘[Citigroup has] been very aggressive and they’ve been
pushing profit growth very hard in a lot of areas. And that means that you pile up
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In addition, Citigroup’s executives’ willingness to buy into rosy
projections despite the realities surrounding its industry demon157
Several studies have
strates overconfidence and an optimism bias.
158
identified overconfidence as a trait affecting corporate CEOs. Individuals in these powerful positions tend to overestimate their own ab159
ilities; they often believe that they are the exception to the rule.
Other financial companies may be affected by the 2008 recession, but
their company will be the lone standing survivor. As one commentarisks that don’t necessarily bother you – unless, all of a sudden, markets chang[ed]’”)
(quoting Professor Roy Smith). “From 2003 to 2005, Citigroup more than tripled its
issuing of [CDOs], to more than $20 billion from $6.28 billion, . . . meaning Citigroup made up to $500 million in fees from the business in 2005 alone.” Dash &
Creswell, supra note 81. Here, “the subsequent discovery of information that indicates harmful consequences flowing from that commitment directly threatens their
self-concept as good, worthwhile individuals. Thus, cognitive processes will work to
suppress such information if at all possible.” Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the
Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 75, 102–03 (1993).
157
See, e.g., Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12 (explaining the common biases);
Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives Decisions, 81 HARV. BUS. R. 56 (2003). See also Bernardo P. Bressane & Marcelo
Verdini Maia, CEO Overconfidence & the Impact on M&A Activity (Sept. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1674467 (empirical study suggesting association between CEO overconfidence bias and management decisions in M&A context); Paul Hribar & Holly Yang,
Does CEO Overconfidence Affect Management Forecasting and Subsequent Earnings Management?
(Mar.
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/accounting/docs/Summer_Camp/Hribar.Yang,Does.CEO.
Overconfidence.Affect.Mgmt...pdf (empirical study suggesting “that [CEO] overconfidence increases the optimistic bias in voluntary forecasts, leading to both an increased likelihood of missing management forecasts and greater earnings management”).
158
Edward Teach, Watch How You Think: Insights from Behavioral Finance Could
Change the Way Companies Approach Mergers and Acquisitions, CFO MAG., Jan. 2004,
available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011331/c_3046604 (“Every CEO who
goes into [an acquisition] thinks he is different–that he will be able to pull it off.”);
see also Troy A. Parades, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 676 (2005) (“A rich body of
subsequent empirical research has shown that acquisitions frequently destroy firm
value when a bidder’s managers overvalue the deal and overestimate their ability to
execute the deal successfully.”); Ribstein, supra note 28, at 81 (“Executives also are
susceptible to overconfidence, particularly those who have the highest self-esteem
and who may also be the most successful.”).
159
See, e.g., Hribar & Yang, supra note 157, at 4 (explaining thesis that
“[o]verconfident managers are more likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts because they overestimate their ability to affect their financial results and/or underestimate the probability of random events” and testing thesis through empirical study);
see also PAUL C. NUTT, WHY DECISIONS FAIL: AVOIDING THE BLUNDERS AND TRAPS THAT
LEAD TO DEBACLES (2002) (describing overconfidence and commitment bias present
in Disney’s decision to open Euro Disney); Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12; Prentice, supra note 24.
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tor observes, “[M]any companies may unintentionally engage in excessive optimism, especially when their existence depends on favora160
ble forecasts.”
Finally, framing can play a significant role in risk-management
161
decisions. “Studies on framing of legal risks find, for example, that
taxpayers who owe money are more likely to cheat on their taxes than
162
Although framing arguably intaxpayers who expect a refund.”
fected some of Citigroup’s decisions in 2007, a framing bias likely had
a much larger impact in creating the situation in which Citigroup
found itself at that time.
Consider the following account:
In 2005, stung by regulatory rebukes and unable to follow Mr.
Weill’s penchant for expanding Citigroup’s holdings through rapid-fire takeovers, Mr. Prince and his board of directors decided to
push even more aggressively into trading and other businesses
that would allow Citigroup to continue expanding the bank in163
ternally.

As Mr. Prince searched for ways to regain Citigroup’s prowess, he and
his colleagues likely were operating in a loss frame, making them
164
more risk seeking.
“This risk taking might be conscious, but deci160

Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12.
Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 797 (2003) (“[F]raming bias is the tendency to view a
given problem in different terms depending on the perspective from which the problem is viewed.”); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (explaining framing bias); X.T. Wang, Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION
PROCESSES, Nov. 1996, at 145 (same).
162
Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and
Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 404 (2004); see also Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 779, 784
(1997) (“But I think that there are enough examples where framing leads investors
to violate simple economic principles that the SEC and the courts would want to recognize it.”).
163
Dash & Creswell, supra note 81; see also Mara Der Hovanesian et al., Can Chuck
Prince Clean Up Citi?, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2004, at 32, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_40/b3902049_mz011.htm
(describing many challenges facing Mr. Prince in turning around Citigroup). For
example, one commentator observed, “[Mr. Prince] came in at a time when you
know a famous leader had been yanked away and there were a lot of problems in the
past. All sorts of market disruptions occurred. And he wasn’t a charismatic leader
who could rally the troops necessarily.” Jim Zarroli, supra note 149 (quoting Professor Roy Smith).
164
See, e.g., Painter, supra note 162, at 403 (“Some psychological studies suggest
that decision makers are risk averse when deciding between two alternatives that they
perceive to result in a gain, but risk preferring when deciding between two alternatives that they perceive to result in a loss.”); Wang, supra note 161, at 146 (describing
161
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sion makers can also conceal risk-preferring behavior from them165
selves by adjusting their estimates of risk artificially downwards.”
Notably, cognitive biases can overlap and often enable each other. For example, the loss framing that might have influenced Mr.
Prince’s initial decision to invest aggressively in the CDO market likely made him susceptible to confirmation and commitment biases with
respect to the success of that strategy (as well as his overall strategic
166
plan for Citigroup).
Moreover, cognitive biases were not the only
factors contributing to Citigroup’s scenario. Citigroup certainly had
weak controls and risk management, and it admittedly was dealing
167
with a very difficult economic environment.
The presence of cognitive biases in the decision-making process,
however, cautions against blind reliance on more internal controls
and risk management as the solution. As discussed below, the de168
signers of any ERM program should consider cognitive biases. Reflecting on the Citigroup scenario, having more high-level individuals
responsible for risk assessment and having direct access to individuals
on the ground gathering the risk-related information might have
shattered the confirmation bias sooner. Part of Citigroup’s problem

loss framing in context of Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory and explaining
that, under this theory). “[P]eople code the possible choice outcomes as gains and
losses, and tend to be risk averse when choosing among prospects seen as gains but
risk seeking when choosing among prospects seen as losses.” Id.; see also Richard H.
Thaler et al., The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test,
Q. J. ECON., May 1997, at 647, 648, available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/
fac/Kfir_Eliaz/Thaler1.pdf (explaining myopic loss aversion and noting that
“[e]mpirical estimates find that losses are weighted about twice as strongly as gains”).
165
Painter, supra note 162, at 404.
166
Indeed, even after announcing huge losses in October 2007, Mr. Prince continued to pronounce his confidence in Citigroup and his vision for the firm, stating:
“No one can be happy with the results in our fixed-income business or with the results that relate to that. But, I think if you are able to look at other parts of the business, if you look at the strategic plan we’re executing on, I think any fair-minded person would say that strategic plan is working.” Zarroli, supra note 149.
167
See, e.g., Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Feb. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm (“Recent
market conditions, particularly during the latter part of 2007 and 2008, have involved
unprecedented dislocations and highlight the limitations inherent in using historical
data to manage risk.”); Eric Dash, Citigroup Acknowledges Poor Risk Management, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, at C9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/
business/16citi.html (“Citigroup acknowledged yesterday that its risk management
models did not function properly during this summer’s credit crisis, contributing to
the company’s 57 percent drop in third-quarter profit.”).
168
See infra Part V.C.
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appears to be that most risk information and decisions funneled
169
through Mr. Maheras.
B. Cultural Barriers to Effective ERM
When Mr. Prince took over as CEO of Citigroup, the firm had a
reputation for being aggressive and obsessed with maximizing short170
term gains. At the time, Citigroup was under intense scrutiny for its
roles in Enron and WorldCom, as well as questionable trading practices in Japan and Europe. Mr. Prince vowed to change corporate
culture but ultimately remained aggressive in his pursuit of profits,
creating a culture where “senior managers got addicted to the reve171
nues and arrogant about the risks they were running.”
Citigroup is not alone in promoting an aggressive, win-at-all-cost
corporate culture. That culture arguably is the norm in the United
172
States.
The 2008 recession has called into question the utility of
that culture, and many policymakers and commentators, including
173
ERM proponents, are pushing for an overhaul of corporate culture.
But change is hard and slow, and memories of tragic events like the

169

See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81.
See, e.g., Louise Cooper, Scandal-hit Citigroup Rebuilds Its Image, BBC NEWS (Mar.
14, 2005, 3:26 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4318333.stm.
171
See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81; Zarroli, supra note 149 (noting that Citigroup under Mr. Prince has “been very aggressive and . . . pushing profit growth very
hard in a lot of areas”).
172
See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera et al., Damning Insight into Corporate Culture Sheds
Light on Fall of a Wall Street Giant, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0441982-2e40-11df-85c0-00144feabdc0.html (noting
that the examiner report on Lehman Brothers describes the firm as an “organisation
prepared to take short cuts and huge risks to boost earnings, where control and accounting procedures were found to be sorely lacking”); Psychology of Enron’s Demise,
supra note 151, at 54 (“Enron has been described as having an arrogant climate.
Such a climate is prone to greater homogeneity because differing views are not valued. This homogeneity can result in exaggerating the impact of various decisionmaking biases.”). Cynthia Webster & Allyn White, Exploring the National and Organizational Culture Mix in Service Firms, J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. (2009) (describing a study
analyzing corporate cultures in United States and Japan and observing that the “U.S.
is characterized by such values as assertiveness, decisiveness, innovativeness . . . and
risk-taking, which stem from its frontier-conquering history.”). Interestingly, J.P.
Morgan’s corporate culture has been described as “‘extremely cautious, ultraconservative,’ and bureaucratic.” Liz Wolgemuth, JPMorgan and Bear Stearns: A Culture Challenge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.usnews.com/
money/careers/articles/2008/03/31/jpmorgan-and-bear-stearns-a-culturechallenge.html. This difference may reflect J.P. Morgan’s earlier embrace of general
ERM principles. See supra note 144.
173
See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
170
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2008 recession are short. Moreover, pressure in the boardroom to
increase the bottom line remains.
Notably, studies suggest a strong link between corporate culture
174
and risk-management practices. For example, one study of firms in
thirty-five different countries shows a strong, negative association between harmonious corporate cultures and risk taking and a strong,
positive association between individual-centric corporate cultures and
175
risk taking. The study defines “harmony” in the context of cultures
that are “more accepting of traditional ways of doing business rather
176
than striving for innovation.” It defines “individualism” in the context of cultures that “focus on individual freedom and personal chal177
lenge.”
Perhaps not surprisingly, the United States scored the
178
highest on cultures exhibiting individual-centric characteristics.
Although this study focuses on corporate culture in relation to
country of origin, its data provide helpful insight into the values that
179
enhance or detract from cultivating a risk culture. As demonstrated
by the Citigroup scenario, a win-at-all-costs culture may impede a firm
embracing ERM beyond a pure process approach. ERM proponents
recognize this limitation, which drives in part their strong emphasis
180
on corporate culture.
“Enterprise risk management—to be effective—must fundamentally change the way organizations think about
181
risk.” Accordingly, in addition to mechanisms to mitigate cognitive
biases, policymakers and ERM proponents must create incentives for
U.S. boards and management to buy into a risk culture.
C. Strengthening ERM Proposals
More people knowing more information and accepting responsibility for risk decisions is a good first step in addressing riskmanagement failures. ERM provides a useful framework to achieve
those objectives. But a firm adopting ERM or even just more rigorous risk-management procedures will not necessarily improve risk174

See Dale Griffin et al., Cultural Values and Corporate Risk Taking 1–4 (March
17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362163 (describing prior studies on culture and risk taking).
175
Id. at 7, 28–29.
176
Id. at 7.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 13.
179
Id. at 17–23.
180
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 5–7, 8 (Apr. 27, 2010).
181
RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 9.
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182

management decisions. Risk-related regulations and best practices
need to account for cognitive biases and the challenges in creating
true risk cultures, and whether through regulation or the markets,
firms need incentives to commit the time and resources necessary to
develop effective ERM.
1.

Breaking down the Behavioral Barrier

Overcoming cognitive bias is a tricky endeavor. One popular
approach is training to sensitize individuals to their potential biases.
This technique is used in a variety of settings, including discrimina183
tion in the workplace and strategic decisions in the courtroom.
Studies are split regarding the utility of training, and some commentators observe the risk of the training itself being biased or creating
184
new biases.
Nevertheless, as boards and management consider
ERM and reflect on risk-related decisions, training regarding decision-making skills, including the impact of cognitive biases, may
185
complement the process with nominal downside risk.

182

See supra Part V.A.
See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20–29 (2001); Alafair Burke,
Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512
(2007) (discussing debiasing training in prosecutor/litigation context); Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
184
See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 183, at 29–30 (describing uncertainty regarding
success of bias training and noting dearth of empirical support for approach); Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be Improved? 379–80 (Persp. on
Psychol. Sci., Working Paper No. 08-102, 2008) (noting that studies show that training produces only minimal success); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sustein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 229 (2006) (“But in some circumstances, a
strategy of debiasing through law could introduce new distortions through its effect
on those who did not previously exhibit bounded rationality.”); Lipshaw, supra note
8, at 21 (“But the recursiveness of self-analysis is problematic in the internal making,
as opposed to the analysis, of judgments; one may attempt to assess the extent of
one’s own bias, framing issues, heuristics, and so, but the analysis itself may be subject to those same influences.”).
185
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 788–92 (2002) (suggesting training to combat investor
biases); Jolls & Sustein, supra note 184, at 234 (“[D]ebiasing through law—especially
debiasing through substantive law—is a distinctive and sometimes far preferable alternative to the strategy of insulating legal outcomes from the effects of bounded rationality.”); see also Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination
Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 860 (2007) (suggesting that
training, in connection with structural changes, may address biases more effectively
at least in workplace discrimination context).
183
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This is not to say that boards will automatically make better or
unbiased decisions; they might not. The training, however, would increase the prospect of boards and management at least hesitating and
186
reflecting on a decision before pulling the trigger. That reflection
time could result in some better outcomes. Many firms have incor187
porated ongoing training for their boards. Extending that training
to management to cover cognitive biases likely can be done at little
cost and with significant potential return.
In addition to training, boards and management could create
objective tools to gauge biases. For example, in setting the firm’s risk
appetite, the board and management could breakout in detail the
firm’s acceptable risk exposure overall and in different segments or
projects and then adopt rigorous approval procedures for changing
188
or making exceptions to those designations. By setting parameters
at the outset—before any surprises or exigencies—boards and management would have an objective measure for their subsequent decisions. The change/exception approval process again would mandate
a moment of hesitation and give decision makers the opportunity to
recognize any bias. They may still miss the opportunity, but it gives
the individuals involved in the process yet another chance to get it
right.
Another technique would be employing an outside consultant to
model potential risks and to role-play with the board and manage189
ment.
Here, the consultant basically would play devil’s advocate,

186
See, e.g., Green, supra note 184, at 858–60; Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke,
Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 130–35 (1994) (explaining ways to improve outcomes of bias training by emphasizing awareness of, motivation for and consequences/direction of bias).
187
See, e.g., Enterprise Risk Management Initiative: Enterprise Risk Management Executive
CAROLINA
STATE
UNIVERSITY,
Education,
NORTH
http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/index.php/about/executive-training
(explaining
targeted ERM training programs for boards and board committees).
188
See supra Part II.B (discussing mapping and profiling aspects of ERM).
189
An outside consultant could serve in various capacities. For example, studies
regarding the impact of training show a greater success rate with hands-on personal
coaching for the decision maker. See Katherine L. Milkman et al., supra note 184, at
382. Alternatively, the consultant could serve as a “choice architect,” who “design[s]
situations in which choices are made . . . to maximize the odds that decision makers
will make wise choices.” Id. at 386–87 (citing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ.
Press) (2008)). A similar proposal is being encouraged in Australia. See Leon Gettler, Reversing Risks, IN THE BLACK, Nov. 2009, at 39, available at
http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/newsletters/36-39_Reversing_%20Risks.pdf (“A real
opportunity lies in developing roles in companies with risk expertise, for experts who
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identifying remote or seemingly inconsequential risks and countering
the board’s and management’s responses with opposing perspec190
tives.
In Citigroup’s scenario, a consultant could have asked the
hard questions like why are Citigroup’s holdings safe while others in
the industry are exposed. If Citigroup had responded that it was relying on its ratings from outside agencies, the consultant could have
asked why an outsider’s assessment of the firm’s risk should trump an
internal assessment and point out that outside perspectives typically
are based on information provided by the firm.
It is of course easy to script this conversation with the benefit of
191
hindsight and much more difficult to do it in the moment.
The
purpose of the consultant would not necessarily be to identify what
the board and management missed. Rather, a primary objective
would be to facilitate or teach the board and management how to fa192
cilitate conversations leading to that information.
In that regard,
the consultant technique could be a once-a-year training program or
a resource tapped into in times of uncertainty.
2.

Breaking down Cultural Barriers

As articulated in the ERM literature, the board and senior management must implement and maintain the creation of a risk cul193
ture.
ERM training again may help boards and management appreciate exactly what it means to have a risk culture and the value of
that culture. The training, however, will not create a risk culture; a
194
risk culture will be the product of board and management initiative.
Why would a board agree to create a risk culture? The board
has a duty to maximize shareholder wealth, and many firms abide by
can go in and model scenarios for managers to get a much deeper understanding of
their risk profile.”).
190
See, e.g., Burke, supra note 183, at 523–28 (discussing potential value of having
internal and external checks on decision making, including checks that challenge
thinking or assumptions of decision maker); Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case
for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, Mar. 22, 2010, at 8, available at
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/PDFDownload.aspx?ar=2551&srid=7&gp=1
(urging internal and external review of risk options and noting that “[s]ometimes,
simply coaxing managers to articulate the experiences influencing them is valuable”). The President & CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has suggested an
outside review by regulatory supervisors that could ask firms questions regarding risk
exposures, including those viewed as nominal by the particular firm, and then “could
evaluate the impact and perhaps conclude that the chance of a cascading systemic
financial crisis was too big of a chance to take.” Rosengren, supra note 81.
191
See supra note 133.
192
See Lovallo & Sibony, supra note 190.
193
See supra note 38.
194
See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
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a high-risk, high-reward strategy. And is not failure just a risk of
doing business?
Those are difficult questions, and the answer may not be the
same for every firm. Boards, management, and stakeholders looking
to avoid the extraordinary and unexpected losses experienced in recent corporate scandals and the 2008 recession might find the endeavor worthwhile. As noted above, more data showing the value of
ERM may help convince these firms to adopt the procedures volunta195
rily (or involuntarily under stakeholder pressure).
Alternatively,
196
policymakers could mandate compliance. In either event, training
and motivation will be crucial to ERM’s success.
3.

Regulating ERM

As business techniques, ERM and the approaches for addressing
bias and creating a risk culture sound great, but do they raise legal
issues or require legal intervention? ERM directly impacts corporate
governance. To the extent that the law evaluates and governs the relationship between the board, management, and shareholders, ERM
invokes legal consideration. Nevertheless, this Article does not suggest that the law should mandate ERM for every corporation in every
197
context.
Rather, ERM appears better suited as a best practice for corporate governance that would offer firms legal protection against certain liabilities. The framework for this approach largely exists in the

195

See supra notes 52–55.
See, e.g., Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 92, at 47–52, 54 (proposing a thoughtful approach to mandating more thorough risk management procedures through
regulation that focuses on, among other things, deliberation, contemporaneous rationale and regulator oversight).
197
Imposing a mandatory risk management scheme on all public corporations
likely would increase resistance to implementing meaningful ERM programs and encourage thoughtless compliance with the stated process. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Game Theory, Insurance and Kant: Toward a Moral Theory of
Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083, 1088 (2004) (examining the shortcomings
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and similar legislation and observing that “[f]rom the positivist point of view, Sarbanes-Oxley is a rule that imposes an obligation on corporate
directors not to repeat the sins of the Enron and WorldCom debacles. And public
companies have duly obeyed, like drivers at stop signs in empty intersections at three
a.m., often out of compliance for compliance sake, and not for salutary benefit that
should result from compliance”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (assessing the utility
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act based on the information and process underlying the legislation). The complexity of business-risk decisions and the variance based on a
number of critical factors, including industry and size counsel in favor of encouraging ERM through best practices and incentives.
196
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regulations adopted after the corporate scandals in the early 2000s.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the NYSE listing requirements already
require corporations to consider risk and adopt codes of ethics, and
199
the listing requirements also require board training. A firm could
easily expand a code of ethics to cover its risk-management policy,
200
and it could likewise expand training in scope and attendance.
Moreover, firms could opt out of these requirements by disclosing
their decision to do so, recognizing that they lose any protections or
201
defenses available to firms following the guidelines.
As to those protections and defenses, the Sentencing Guidelines
could provide reduced penalties for firms establishing an ERM pro202
gram that complies with best practices. The SEC could grant additional weight to ERM programs in considering whether to file enforcement actions, and courts could use ERM best practices as
evidence refuting knowledge in securities cases and proving good
faith where boards are alleged to have failed to act in the face of a
203
known duty or risk. Even in the context of duty-to-monitor claims,
ERM could expedite or streamline the litigation, particularly if selfregulatory organizations or similar institutions emerge to review and
204
certify ERM programs.
198

See supra notes 27–31.
See supra Part III.A. As discussed above, many commentators criticize the onesize-fits-all nature of many aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as certain of its
other features. Id. The proposals discussed in this Article try to avoid many of those
pitfalls.
200
See, e.g., Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 151, at 55–58 (suggesting use of
a code of ethics and training to create a more ethical corporate culture). Notably,
many firms have both a code of ethics and a code of conduct. A firm’s code of conduct also might be an appropriate place to discuss risk policies either in addition to
or in lieu of discussing it in the code of ethics.
201
See, e.g., supra Part II.A (discussing the “disclose or explain” nature of the ethics
code requirements under the Sarbanes Oxley Act); see also Luca Enriques & Paolo
Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PRINCIPLES 117,
134–36 (2007) (describing process whereby German firms may opt out of certain governance requirements upon a vote of shareholders representing at least 75% of the
shares).
202
See supra Parts II.A, III.A; see also Hess, supra note 31, at 1806–16 (discussing
challenges and benefits of trying to encourage ethical corporate cultures under the
Sarbanes Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines).
203
See supra Part III.B.2; see also Harner, supra note 3, at 55–56.
204
“Self-regulation is a broad concept that includes any attempt by an industry to
moderate its conduct with the intent of improving marketplace behavior for the ultimate benefit of consumers. The universe of self-regulatory organizations includes
industry-wide or economy-wide private groups that provide, inter alia, certification,
product information, complaint resolution, quality assurance, industrial standards,
product compatibility standards, professional conduct standards, and complaint reso199
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In determining what constitutes best practices and whether to
acknowledge a process as effective ERM, policymakers and industry
players need to consider the potential barriers to effective ERM, in205
cluding those discussed in this Article.
Accordingly, best practices
should include training on cognitive biases, require objective risk setting and risk-modification standards, and recommend outside consultants. They also should emphasize the board’s role in creating a risk
culture and require boards to demonstrate their commitment to that
culture through the firm’s code of ethics, dissemination of risk information, and participation in the process. Using a best-practices
approach allows firms to tailor ERM programs to their specific needs
or adapt those programs to internal or external changes.
In addition to regulatory incentives to adopt ERM, the markets
206
could be very influential in ERM’s meaningful development.
As
stakeholders realize the value of ERM, shareholders can request that
firms adopt ERM either informally or through shareholder proposals,
and lenders can address ERM disclosures in their transaction documents. Likewise, as investors become more knowledgeable about
ERM, they may make investment decisions based on firms with certified or well-documented ERM programs. As discussed above, Standard & Poor’s is already working to provide investors with this type of
207
information.
Just as risk management did not cause the 2008 recession, improving risk-management practices through ERM or otherwise will
not prevent the next one. Nevertheless, thoughtful and considered
risk planning may mitigate the losses suffered by firms in the next
economic downturn and generally constitutes good business. To the
extent that such practices preserve firm value and thereby protect

lution.” Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address before the
Council of Better Business Bureaus: Self Regulatory Organizations and the FTC (Apr.
11, 2005); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008) (explaining use and potential issues relating to SROs); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with
Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
975, 1022–26 (2005) (reviewing traditional use of SROs in securities industry).
205
See supra Parts V.A, V.B.
206
See Harner, supra note 3, at 52–53; see also INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE NETWORK, supra note 180 (encouraging institutional investors to take an
active role in reviewing and assessing a firm’s risk management practices, explaining
“[t]he objective of these principles is to help investors assess how well a portfolio
company’s board—either unitary or supervisory—is effectively overseeing risk management.”).
207
See supra Part III.A.
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stakeholders’ interests, policymakers and markets should provide appropriate incentives for firms to adopt meaningful ERM.
VI. CONCLUSION
As some commentators have observed, the 2008 recession was a
208
“wake-up call” for risk management. Many firms not only were surprised by developments during the recession but also had no effective
means to communicate or respond to the changing financial landscape. The subprime-mortgage crisis and subsequent events paralyzed their operations. Better risk-management practices would not
have averted the 2008 recession, but they might have shortened the
duration and eased the severity of the financial turmoil.
As policymakers and firms reflect on the recession, they should
consider how risk-management improvements can help firms operate
more efficiently and be better prepared for the next round of operational or economic surprises. Here, ERM offers a technique for firmwide risk identification, assessment, and response that involves the
board of directors, senior management, and appropriate individuals
209
throughout the firm. Like any risk-management practice, however,
ERM has its limitations and is not a cure for all corporate ills.
Policymakers and industry organizations promulgating best
practices should recognize the behavioral and cultural barriers to effective risk management and encourage processes that account for
those limitations. Among other things, guidelines suggesting ERM
and cognitive-bias training and the integration of risk practices into
codes of ethics might assist firms in developing meaningful risk as210
sessment and not simply more risk-related process. The goal of any
risk-related policy should be helping firms make better-informed decisions—both as to the substance of the problem and the means for
reaching the decision itself. As Warren Buffet has observed, “Risk
211
comes from not knowing what you’re doing.”

208

See id.
See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
210
See supra Part V.C.
211
Brad Tuttle, Warren Buffet’s Boring, Brilliant Wisdom, IT’S YOUR MONEY (Mar. 1,
2010, 9:06 AM), available at http://money.blogs.time.com/2010/03/01/warrenbuffetts-boring-brilliant-wisdom.
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